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JOSEPH BLOCHER*Paul Horwitz's First Amendment Institutions' is a comprehensive
treatment of the theory, application, and complexity of an
institutional approach to the First Amendment. It is a wonderful
book-full of nuanced theoretical analysis, 2 careful parsing of legal
doctrine,3 and bold and innovative arguments that would substantially
reshape constitutional law.4 Horwitz's work is designed and destined to be
among the standard references for judges and scholars who employ an
institutional approach to the First Amendment-this reviewer
unabashedly among them.6
The two main goals of this brief review are to describe the book's
arguments and to identify some important questions that the book does not
fully answer. The latter are not intended as a criticism. The scope of the
work unavoidably encourages the reader to linger on newly-opened vistas,
which in turn invite exploration and further questions. This review
attempts to sketch a map for those expeditions.
Associate Professor, Duke Law School; B.A., History, Rice University (2001); J.D., Yale
Law School (2006).
PAUL HORWITz, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013).
See, e.g., id. at 77-182 (discussing political theory and religious doctrine regarding "sphere
sovereignty").
See, e.g., id. at 184-89 (discussing constitutional rules regarding church autonomy).
See id. at 10 (suggesting, inter alia, that First Amendment doctrine should be modified by
"[g]ranting the press new constitutional privileges to conceal sources and to engage in
newsgathering practices without legal interference" and "[a]llowing libraries to follow their
own policies on the use of Internet filters, even when the government demands the use of
filters as a condition of funding").
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1256, 1260 (2005) (illustrating that the arguments against the institutional approach are
inadequate without suggesting the method for employing the institutional approach).
See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 823-29 (2008).
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I. The Book: First Amendment Institutions
Near the outset of First Amendment Institutions, Horwitz neatly
summarizes his book's main aims:
My goal in this book is twofold: to bring attention to the central
infrastructural role played by First Amendment institutions in
public discourse and think about how the law might reflect that
role, and more generally to encourage us to think about how First
Amendment law might be more responsive to the real world of
public discourse and less fixated on acontextual legal rules.7
The book pursues these two goals in three parts.
The first part of the book is devoted to the basic case for First
Amendment institutionalism. Horwitz's foil is the "acontextual" impulse
he attributes to many courts and scholars-the effort to be "indifferent to
what we might call real world context and highly attentive to legal
context."8 First Amendment scholars, in particular, "habitually ignore real-
world context and focus instead on one central distinction: that between
the speaker and the state."9 That kind of spot-blindness seems to bother
Horwitz as a general matter, but in the book he is specifically focused "on a
particular aspect of law's indifference to context: its 'institutional
agnosticism." 0
His prescription for this deficiency is-not surprisingly-a dose of
institutionalism: "I argue that we should take context seriously. In
particular, we should take seriously the simple fact that a good deal of the
speech and conduct that makes up some of the most important aspects of
the lived world of First Amendment activity takes place through
institutions."" By First Amendment institutions, Horwitz means those
"whose contributions to public discourse play a fundamental role in our
system of free speech." 2 This definition is expansive enough to include not
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 22.
Id. at 5; see also id. at 68 ("[L]egal minds carve up the world ... or at least yearn to do so-
acontextually. That is, rather than focus on concepts and categories drawn from social life and
the everyday world, they focus on broad concepts and categories drawn from legal thought
itself.").
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 12 (quoting Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 589
(2005)). Horwitz notes that this definition opens up the thorny problem -faced by many other
scholars, including Robert Post-of defining what counts as "public discourse." See, e.g., id. at
82-85. I have tried to address that issue elsewhere, but hold it aside for now. See generally
Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, and the Press, 87 WASH . L. REV. 409 (2012).
I would note, though, that I think Horwitz might over-emphasize the degree to which
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only large-scale institutions, such as "the press," but individual
representatives of those institutions -what I would call "organizations" 3 -
such as the New York Times.14
The second part of the book measures the first part's normative
analysis against current First Amendment doctrine regarding universities,
the press, churches, libraries, and associations. That Horwitz grounds his
theoretical discussion in constitutional doctrine is a significant
contribution, for it shows the degree to which his theory finds support in
existing law, and what changes it would demand. That said, the
relationship between Horwitz's normative account of the First Amendment
and the status of existing doctrine could perhaps be clarified. At times, he
seems to be operating from an external perspective, criticizing existing
doctrine for failing to accommodate institutional perspective:
At least on its face, then, First Amendment doctrine is not driven
by contextual factors such as the nature of the speech or the
identity of the speaker. Instead, what is doing the doctrinal work
in this area is a set of broader categories that are fundamentally
legal and acontextual.1 s
But as the qualifying clause, "[a]t least on its face," suggests, the notion
that existing doctrine is context-agnostic might be slightly overstated.
Indeed, Horwitz himself later notes that "in some respects First
Amendment doctrine has already taken the institutional turn, albeit not as
forthrightly as it might."1 6 Consider public forum doctrine, which Horwitz
identifies as an acontextual culprit.1 Though it might be true that specific
applications of public forum doctrine tend to be context-neutral, the very
shape of the doctrine gives special treatment to the kinds of places-like
streets and parks-that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
Post's conception of public discourse is limited to "the formal political process." HORWITZ,
supra note 1, at 84. Post's account is certainly more state-centered than Horwitz's, but I read
Post as arguing that "First Amendment coverage should extend to all efforts deemed
normatively necessary for influencing public opinion," not simply to those regarding the
political process. Compare id. at 84, with ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 18 (2012)
(emphasis added).
Blocher, supra note 6, at 860-63 (describing the critical distinction between speech
institutions and speech organizations).
See HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 11.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 55.
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public questions."" This seems like precisely the kind of historical,
contextual analysis of the kind Horwitz advocates.
This is nitpicking, to be sure. Horwitz never says that current First
Amendment doctrine is fully adverse to his theory. I raise the point only to
suggest that keeping his doctrinal friends closer might take some of the
sting out of his critique, but would, in doing so, strengthen the normative
force of his argument. After all, as Robert Post-a scholarly hero of
Horwitz's 9 -points out, "we can learn the purposes we have constructed
First Amendment doctrine to achieve by tracing the contours of actual First
Amendment coverage."20
Horwitz's book concludes by considering various "problems and
prospects" of First Amendment institutionalism. Horwitz notes that the
institutional turn "is not meant to be the sole guide for First Amendment
doctrine," 21 and that even within its limited scope, it is not perfect. For one
thing, it may fail to capture powerful First Amendment values such as
distrust of government or commitment to individualism. Horwitz
forthrightly acknowledges these criticisms, and has powerful answers to
most of them. The remainder of this review will attempt to identify a few
more lines of inquiry.
II. Institutional Rules of Recognition
As should be evident from the account above, one of the many virtues
of Horwitz's book is that it seeks to provide not only a theoretical account
of what free speech institutions are and why they are important, but also
how doctrine can take account of them. In Horwitz's hands, First
Amendment institutionalism is a tool for judges, and for the apparently
increasing proportion of constitutional scholars interested in inputs of
constitutional meaning and the resulting outputs of constitutional law.22
Even assuming that a reader is convinced by the case for First
Amendment institutionalism, the road ahead is full of potholes and sharp
turns. Successfully translating institutional theory into doctrine means
walking a thin line between formalism and functionalism23- Horwitz steps
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
See HORWITZ, supra note 1, at xiii.
PosT, supra note 12, at 4-5.
HORWITz, supra note 1, at 261.
Id. at 282-84 (describing this division in constitutional scholarship, and arguing,
"[s]cholars involved in rethinking constitutional doctrine should view First Amendment
institutionalism as a kindred spirit").
Id. at 78 (noting that "First Amendment institutionalism should carve up the world in
functional and institutional ways"); id. at 99 ("The institutional turn might seem to favor
functionalism over formalism, and in some respects it unquestionably does. But that is not
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gingerly in doing so. His central argument is that "law should be
responsive to context, specifically including institutional context," 24 not
that attention to institutional role can answer all of the hard questions in
First Amendment doctrine. This humility is also a virtue of the work. But it
is hard to avoid the fact that any form of First Amendment institutionalism
will lead to disagreement -perhaps intractable disagreement-on at least
three levels:25 which institutions are entitled to First Amendment deference,
which organizations fit within those institutional archetypes, and which
actions of those organizations should be shielded.
A. Which "Institutions" Get Protection?
As Horwitz notes, "[t]he central question for courts contemplating
some version of the institutional turn is how to define the relevant
institutions." 26 He is relatively confident that this question can be
answered: "It doesn't take an expert on free speech to identify them.
Indeed, that's the point. We all know these institutions well, because they
are woven into the fabric of our everyday existence." 27
On some level, this must be correct. Surely, few people would disagree
that the press meets Horwitz's definition of a First Amendment
institution-one whose contributions to public discourse play a
fundamental role in our system of free speech. Indeed, the text of the First
Amendment suggests as much. But when the institution itself is defined at
that level of breadth, the rule of institutional deference is unlikely to
resolve controversies in any useful way. Broadening the institutional
category is likely to raise the costs of decision, by encouraging disputes
about whether particular organizations fall within it. For example, there
might be broad agreement that the press is entitled to special First
Amendment treatment-the Supreme Court itself has often suggested as
much, even though doctrine does not really reflect this treatment 28-and
yet there is wide disagreement about whether bloggers are members of that
institution. (Horwitz himself is not convinced that they are, at least not
always or necessarily the case.").
Id. at 69.
Cf Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1073-78 (2008)
(discussing the proper level of deference between different institutional interpretations of the
First Amendment).
HOROWITZ, supra note 1, at 275.
Id. at 14.
Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2011) ("The
Supreme Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the value of the free press, but it steadfastly
refuses to explicitly recognize any right or protection as emanating solely from the Press
Clause.").
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yet.)29 The broader the empire, the harder it will be to govern "the
borderlands.""o
Furthermore, as Horwitz recognizes, "not everyone trusts
institutions."3' More specifically and problematically, not everyone trusts
the same institutions. Those who believe "the 'mainstream media' have
failed us completely" 32 are not necessarily the same people who believe
"the Boy Scouts and the churches are leviathans." 33 And as Horwitz notes,
the judges tasked with separating the deference-deserving institutions
from the chaff might well be inclined to give special treatment to
traditional speech institutions like newspapers and universities. 34
Rather than relying on a kind of social rule of recognition, one way to
identify the institutions worthy of deference is by focusing on the degree to
which they police their own speech, or that of the individuals within them.
Horwitz repeatedly argues that "First Amendment institutions are self-
regulating," in that they "follow[] a set of professional norms that have been
drilled into them by training, experience, and institutional culture."35 He
notes that this is a "central feature that distinguishes First Amendment
institutions from other institutions and justifies giving them special
treatment under the law."36
But not all forms of self-regulation are worthy of constitutional
deference. A "university" that steadfastly opposes intellectual inquiry is
self-regulating. Presumably, this is not the kind of self-regulation that
merits First Amendment deference. One might respond that any so-called
university behaving in that fashion is not in fact a representative of the
institutional category, and thus cannot claim the deference to which it
might otherwise be entitled.3 This is true, but-as the following section
suggests-it is a separate inquiry whether the institutional category of
universities is entitled to protection.
B. Which "Organizations" Fit Inside the Institutions?
Even if useful agreement can be reached with regard to institutional
HORWITz, supra note 1, at 22.
Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 267.
Id. at 269.
See id.
Id. at 265 ("It is possible that under the institutional turn judges would be slow to
recognize new speech institutions and quicker to protect 'traditional' elite institutions.").
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 15.
Id. at 86.
Cf POST, supra note 12, at 78 (arguing that scholarly disciplinarity is what makes
universities unique, not their titles).
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prototypes such as universities or the press, actual cases or controversies
will turn not only on those prototypes, but on whether particular
organizations fit within them. After all, "the press" will never be a named
party to a legal claim -instead, an action will be filed against, or on behalf
of, some specific organization claiming to be a member of the "press" class.
Identifying these organizations is a distinct inquiry,38 and perhaps a more
difficult one. For example, the debate about whether churches are entitled
to deference as First Amendment institutions39 is different than the debate
about whether the Westboro Baptist Church fits within that institutional
category. So when Horwitz describes his approach to First Amendment
institutionalism as "singling out general kinds of institutions-
newspapers, churches, and so on-and deferring to them as long as they
act within proper (but broadly defined) institutional bounds," 40 he
potentially conflates two distinct and difficult questions. The "borderlands
of First Amendment institutionalism" 41 face different problems than its
heartland.
As Horwitz notes, considerable diversity exists within institutional
archetypes. To take just one example, "[s]ome journalistic entities may
strive to be fair and balanced, while others favor the partisan approach
typical of the press in earlier periods. (And some may call themselves 'fair
and balanced' but still practice partisanship.)" 42 It cannot be the case-and
Horwitz does not argue-that organizations are permitted to determine for
themselves whether they are part of a deference-deserving institution.
Instead, Horwitz seems relatively sanguine about the ability of outside
decisionmakers (judges, presumably) to make distinctions: "It may be
tough to distinguish the New York Times from a local penny-saver in theory,
but it is much easier in practice."43
Whether his optimism is justified is harder to say; the practice of
institutionalism can be just as difficult as the theory. To what epistemic or
decisional authority does one appeal to determine whether a particular
organization, such as a newspaper, is entitled to constitutional deference?
One method would be to say that only those organizations that follow the
First Amendment-furthering, self-regulating norms of the institution are
entitled to special treatment because the existence of those norms are the
HORWITz, supra note 1, at 11 n.31 (noting that the book "elide[s], for some purposes (but
not others), the distinction" between organizations and institutions).
o Id. at 174-93; see also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional
Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 273 (2008).
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 266.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 275.
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primary reason for deferring to the institution in the first place. Indeed,
Horwitz refers to self-regulation as a feature of institutions that "helps us
resolve some (though certainly not all) of the boundary questions that First
Amendment institutionalism raises." 44 One suspects that this is why he is
hesitant to treat blogs as a First Amendment institution: they are not as
self-regulating as newspapers, which "follow a deep set of norms and
practices, all of which are ultimately related to their distinct contribution to
public discourse."45
But this is obviously not always true, in either direction. Newspapers
do not always follow basic journalistic ethics, 46 and sometimes bloggers
do.47 The problem is not only that entities' behavior is dynamic and ever-
changing, but also that professional norms are themselves dynamic. What
counted as appropriate behavior for the press at the time of the Founding
would almost certainly be unacceptable today. This brings us to the third
and final layer of potential disagreement about deference.
C. Which Actions by Covered Organizations Are Entitled to
Protection?
Assuming that institutional prototypes can be identified, and various
organizations slotted into those institutional categories, a third potential
problem remains: how to evaluate the specific actions of those
organizations, particularly when those actions seem to run counter to the
institutional norms that started the cascade of deference.
Horwitz is not fully committed to deference for all actions of covered
institutions: "[C]ourts ought to defer substantially, but not totally, to the
self-regulatory norms and practices of First Amendment institutions." 48
Thus, "a newspaper cannot invoke its institutional status to shield itself
from antidiscrimination laws." 49 As Horwitz explains:
Under autonomy-based institutionalism, in short, First
Amendment institutions would have substantial scope for self-
governance. But courts would still be empowered to ask whether
an institution's actions fell "within the boundaries of behavior
broadly consistent with the norms and practices of that
Id. at 86.
Id. at 94.
See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, FBI to Investigate News Corporation over 9/11 Hacking Allegations,
THE GUARDIAN (July 14, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/14/fbi-news-corp-
hacking-claims.
See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, ihat Blogging Might Teach About Cybernorms, 4 AKRON
INTELL. PROP. J. 239, 239-41 (2010) (discussing the development and identification of norms in
the blogosphere).
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 20.
Id. at 21.
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institution, and whether those norms and practices serve the First
Amendment values that are advanced by the role of that
institution within the broader society."50
But if the point of First Amendment institutionalism is to serve the
values of the First Amendment, then it would seem that the most accurate
way to do so would be to simply ask directly whether the organization
serves those values, rather than to rely on the inaccurate proxy of an
institution's norms and values.
Of course, the whole theory of institutionalism argues to the contrary.>
The very idea of Horwitz's argument is that institutional deference is
inherently valuable, and that it will better further those values than an
acontextual approach. Because I share his enthusiasm for an institutional
First Amendment, the questions I raise here are anxious hand-wringing as
much as they are criticisms. If I part ways with Horwitz, it is with regard to
his conclusion that "the definitional inquiry" for First Amendment
institutionalism is not "any more troubling than the kinds of questions
courts already ask."52 For the reasons sketched above, I fear that the
definitional inquiry is particularly difficult, on at least three levels:
identifying institutions, deciding which organizations fit within them, and
determining which actions of those organizations merit deference. But the
difficulty of answering these questions is no reason not to ask them.
Indeed, Horwitz's book provides both an argument for the investigation
and a map for its potential solution.
Id. at 93 (emphasis added) (quoting Paul Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment
Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard Questions, 54 UCLAL. REV. 1497, 1511 (2007)).
Cf Schauer, supra note 5, at 1273 n.87 ("I am [concerned] with the identification of
concrete and preexisting cultural institutions that might in the large serve important free
speech functions, and which thus might be deserving of constitutionally guaranteed
autonomy as institutions, even when they do not serve the purposes grounding the
recognition of their institutional autonomy in the first instance.").
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 276.
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